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Abstract
We analyze the role of community rating in the optimal design of a risk adjustment
scheme in competitive health insurance markets when insurers have better information
on their customers’ risk profiles than the sponsor of health insurance. The sponsor offers
insurers a menu of risk adjustment schemes to elicit this information. The optimal scheme
includes a voluntary reinsurance option. Additionally, the scheme should sometimes be
complemented by a community rating requirement. The resulting inefficient coverage of
low-cost types lowers the sponsor’s cost of separating different insurer types. This allows
the sponsor to redistribute more rents from low-cost to high-cost consumers.
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1. Introduction
Many countries with private health insurance markets feature premium rate restrictions in the
form of community rating (CR), see Gale (2007) for an overview. This means that insurers have
to accept any customer and charge the same price to each customer for a given contract.1 Policy
makers’ motivation for CR is to enforce solidarity among high-risk and low-risk consumers on
the health insurance market. In the absence of CR, insurers can engage in third degree price
discrimination, also known as risk rating (RR), and charge high (low) prices to high (low) risk
consumers.
Health economists tend to see CR as a misguided policy, because it “requires insurers to
ignore information about risk that they actually do have when they set the premiums” (Pauly,
2008, pp. 121). If insurers are not allowed to use this information in setting prices, they use
other means, such as quality, waiting lists for providers in the network, or co-payments to
separate risk types. As we know from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) this reduces welfare.2
In this paper we argue that CR can be part of a second-best policy if two conditions are
met. First, insurers are able to risk select insured along dimensions that the sponsor of health
insurance, an employer or the government, cannot contract on. Second, CR is combined with
a form of risk adjustment that combines both ex ante and ex post risk adjustment (sometimes
referred to as prospective and retrospective risk adjustment).
Ex ante risk adjustment taxes or subsidizes the insurer based on observable characteristics
of its insured that provide a signal of expected health costs. Ex ante risk adjustment requires
verifiable data that is relatively easy to obtain for the sponsor of health insurance. If all
dimensions along which the insurer can risk-select were contractible, the sponsor could force
insurers to only offer the welfare maximizing contract. A sponsor who values solidarity between
high risk and low risk types, could then require that this contract is offered at the same
price to each customer, and compensate insurers for cost differences using perfect ex ante
risk adjustment.
In practice, the insurer usually has more information on its insured than the sponsor,3 and
1This is also referred to as ‘pure community rating’. Less restrictive forms might allow for some rate
differentiation according to, for instance, age.
2See Van de Ven and Schut (2011, pp. 394) for further arguments why CR remains so popular with policy
makers. They argue that risk adjustment is a better instrument than CR to achieve solidarity between risk
types. We derive conditions under which it is optimal to combine CR and risk adjustment.
3Also, the sponsor may not want to use some variables correlated with expected health care costs for ethical
reasons, think of ethnicity or religion, or because including them would decrease insurers’ incentives to reduce
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can select on this information in a way that is not contractible for the sponsor. An insurer
selectively contracting some providers can exclude the ones that are specialized in certain
chronic conditions or contract providers with long waiting lists for particular treatments. The
insurer’s help desk could reply more promptly to certain queries than to others. As these
dimensions are not contractible for the sponsor, the insurer has an advantage which can be
used to game the system. In particular, the insurer tries to cherry pick insured whose expected
costs are low within their (ex ante) risk adjustment class (see e.g. Brown et al., 2011, who
document such strategic behavior for Medicare Advantage in the US).
In contrast, ex post risk adjustment is based on realized costs. It compensates insurers for
consumers that turn out to be costly ex post by repaying part of the realized costs. This is a
form of risk sharing or reinsurance, with the risk adjuster playing the role of the reinsurer (see
e.g. Swartz, 2003; Dow, Fulton and Baicker, 2010). Both forms of risk adjustment reduce the
underlying cost differences and therefore the insurance contracts vary less with risk type.
Ex post risk adjustment leaves no scope for selection to game the system, because costs
are known. Instead, the downside of ex post risk adjustment is that insurers’ incentives for
cost containment are muted when the regulator acts as a reinsurer (Dow, Fulton and Baicker,
2010).4 Moreover, ex post risk adjustment does more than is needed: it averages out all variance
in costs, while removing selection incentives requires the removal of predictable differences in
expected costs only.
An optimal risk adjustment system will contain a combination of both ex ante and ex post
elements. Systems which combine ex ante and ex post risk adjustment indeed exist (see for
instance Van de Ven et al., 2003, who describe how ex ante payments are combined with risk
sharing in various European countries). In the US, the Health Insurance Exchanges that are
being established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act combine a transitory
reinsurance program, and a risk adjustment scheme that will take current period’s diagnoses
as inputs (HHS, 2012). The Dutch risk adjustment system contains both types, though the
explicit ex post component is currently being gradually phased out to stimulate insurers to
contain health care costs.
As noted by Cutler and Reber (1998, pp. 464) “we do not know the optimal combination
of prospective and retrospective risk adjustment”. In this paper we explore this issue when
costs, see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000) and Van de Ven and Schut (2011, pp. 384) for a discussion.
4Note that providing such incentives is often the reason for having private competitive health insurance in
the first place.
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insurers have private information on cost types within observable risk adjustment classes. We
ask whether, in this second-best world, a CR requirement can be an efficient component of such
a risk adjustment scheme with ex ante and ex post compensation.
To design an optimal risk adjustment scheme, we take a mechanism design approach: how
can the sponsor optimally elicit the insurers’ private information on their consumers’ expected
costs? We consider a two-tiered contracting model with perfectly competitive insurers who offer
a menu of contracts to consumers in Rothschild-Stiglitz fashion. The insurers’ incentives for
attracting high or low cost consumers are in turn determined by the sponsor’s risk adjustment
mechanism. We show that, within classes of publicly observable cost predictors, the sponsor
can use ex post risk adjustment to screen insurers on the privately observable part of expected
costs. We then explore whether the sponsor’s objective function, a weighted sum of high and
low type consumers’ surpluses, can be higher under a CR requirement than with RR.
We find that optimal risk adjustment is qualitatively similar under CR and RR: it offers
the insurer a choice whether or not to buy some reinsurance for their customers. The scheme
therefore involves subjective risk adjusting as in Sappington and Lewis (1999). Foregoing some
ex ante payments in exchange for high ex post reinsurance is attractive for an insurer who
knows his customers have high expected health care costs relative to their observed risk class.
Conversely, for an insurer who faces customers with low expected health care costs compared to
their publicly observable characteristics, the costs of reinsurance are higher than the benefits.
This insurer prefers ex ante adjustment only, and is in fact willing to contribute to the risk
adjustment fund, subsidizing the high types. In this way, optimal risk adjustment targets the
information advantage of the insurers vis-a-vis the sponsor, and allows the sponsor to tax low
risk types to subsidize the high-risk types.5
Quantitatively, the optimal schemes under CR and RR as well as the equilibrium outcomes
differ. We find that CR dominates RR if (i) the inefficiency of ex-post reinsurance is not too
big and (ii) the sponsor has a bias towards the high-risk type consumers.
The intuition why CR can raise welfare is that under CR, low-risk types get less generous
coverage than high-risk types. This reduces expected expenditures on these types for insurers.
5Van de Ven and van Vliet also suggested a risk adjustment scheme involving subjective risk adjustment:
“Let an insurer himself decide –within certain boundaries– for which patients, or for which types of care, or
to what extent he wants to share the risk with the Central Fund. (. . . ) An important advantage of such a
flexible form of risk sharing would be that the additional information the insurer might have about the residual
predictable risk that is not accounted for in the capitation payment, will not be employed for cream skimming,
but will be reflected in the preferred form of risk sharing.” (Van de Ven and van Vliet, 1992, italics are in the
original text).
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As the expected costs are lower, the benefits of reinsurance decrease for low risk types. This
makes it easier for the sponsor to screen insurers with low-risk consumers: their benefits of
mimicking the high-type insurers are lower under CR than under RR. Hence, the sponsor can
reduce the inefficiency of ex post risk adjustment under CR and raise welfare.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, our model builds on the adverse
selection framework of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). On top of this asymmetric information
problem between insurers and insured, we add a second layer of asymmetric information: be-
tween insurers and the health insurance sponsor. In Rothschild-Stiglitz, CR induces inefficient
under-insurance of low risk types. Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) observe this theoretical
prediction in the real world. They document a decrease in coverage for the (healthier) young
when the state of New York imposed a CR mandate. Moreover, if insurers cannot reduce
coverage, or other dimensions of generosity, sufficiently to separate high from low cost types,
the insurance market may enter a death-spiral, where lower cost types drop out of the market
entirely, see Cutler and Reber (1998). Chetty and Finkelstein (2012) provide a recent overview
of selection effects in insurance markets.
Second, our paper connects to the risk adjustment literature; see Van de Ven and Ellis
(2000) and Ellis (2008) for overviews of this literature. Ex ante and ex post risk adjustment
have been analyzed separately before. Our paper uses a mechanism design approach in which
ex ante and ex post are combined to elicit the insurer’s private information about customer
types, as in Sappington and Lewis (1999). Whereas they focus on providers who can engage in
high-risk patient dumping, our model focuses on insurers who compete and offer insurance to
all consumers. Selection here takes the form of reduced generosity (e.g. coverage) for low-cost
types. In contrast to Sappington and Lewis (1999), in our work the coverage distortion is
endogenous, and takes place on the second tier in a hierarchical contracting model.
Also in this strand of the literature is Glazer and McGuire (2000). They have a model
where both the sponsor and the insurers have an imperfect signal about a customer’s type.
They show how this imperfect signal should be incorporated in the risk adjustment system to
get an efficient outcome. In our model, the sponsor has no signal about the types in a risk
class. In other words, to the sponsor these types are observationally equivalent. But the insurer
does have more information on these types, and this allows it to game the system. We show
how the sponsor can address this problem by offering combinations of ex ante and ex post risk
adjustment.
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Finally, our model connects to the literature on contracting hierarchies. We consider a two-
tiered model of insurers designing contracts for consumers, which in turn depend on risk adjust-
ment contracts designed by the sponsor for the insurers. Related models are those of DeMarzo,
Fishman and Hagerty (2005) and Faure-Grimaud, Laffont and Martimort (1999), who look at
models of an intermediary supervising an agent, and ask how the principal’s arrangements with
the intermediary affect those downstream contracts. Bijlsma, Boone and Zwart (2014) consider
a health insurance model with risk adjustment, and analyze how risk adjustment parameters
shape insurance contracts when insurers compete imperfectly. In the current work, we are more
explicit about the information asymmetry between principal and intermediaries (the insurers),
and solve for the optimal mechanism both upstream and downstream.
This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the two-tier model of perfectly com-
petitive insurers offering incentive-compatible contracts to consumers and the sponsor offering
incentive-compatible risk-adjustment contracts to insurers. We then analyze optimal risk ad-
justment under both RR and CR requirements. We derive when and why CR outperforms RR.
Proofs can be found in the appendix.
2. The model
We present a two-tier model of risk-adjustment in health insurance. Risk averse consumers, who
can have either high or low expected health-care cost, buy health insurance from perfectly com-
petitive insurers who compete in contracts à la Rothschild and Stiglitz. A regulator or sponsor
offers a menu of risk adjustment contracts to these insurers, in an effort to reduce distortions
in the insurance market (efficiency) and to bring prices for high and low-risk consumers closer
together (solidarity). There is information asymmetry: the sponsor does not observe consumer
health types, while insurers know their own consumers’ types. The sponsor may either allow
insurers to use their information to explicitly price discriminate between consumers, or ban
explicit price discrimination and impose that consumers may buy any contract (with a given
price) that the insurer offers. The former situation we refer to as RR and the latter as CR.
Under CR, the insurers engage in second-degree price discrimination to separate the two types
of consumer.
We follow Rothschild and Stiglitz and assume that the sponsor cannot use contracts to
prohibit second-degree price discrimination. That is, we assume that the variables used to
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separate types are not (all) contractible.
We next describe the agents’ objectives, the structure of the insurance contracts and the
properties of the risk adjustment system that the sponsor designs. We conclude this section by
summarizing the timing of the model.
2.1. Consumers
We consider consumers within an observable risk class, which is defined on the basis of char-
acteristics contractible for the sponsor. These typically include age, sex, and previous treat-
ments (Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000). Within such a risk class –say, female, age 40, no pre-
vious treatments– a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of consumers has low expected health care costs (de-
noted l-consumers), while the remaining 1 − φ consumers have high expected costs (denoted
h-consumers). Type h and l-consumers need treatment with probabilities θh and θl resp., with
θh > θl. A patient who needs treatment incurs treatment costs y. The expected treatment
costs in case of treatment ȳ > 0 are the same for both types.6
Consumers purchase health insurance contracts (p, γ) that are characterised by a price
(premium) p and an inverse measure of generosity γ ≥ 0. The expected cost for the insurer
when a θ-type buys contract (p, γ) equals θ(ȳ − γ); that is, γ is the cost saving for the insurer
of reduced generosity. It may help the reader to follow the exposition, to think of γ as a
copayment, similar to the Rothschild and Stiglitz framework.
As explained in the introduction, we assume that γ is not contractible for the sponsor.
In other words, the sponsor cannot prohibit second degree price discrimination in case of CR.
Other interpretations of γ include, narrow provider network (which allows the insurer to bargain
lower treatment prices), waiting lists (which reduces expected costs by postponing treatments).
Assume that all consumers participate in the insurance market; either because health in-
surance is mandatory or because the sponsor is willing to subsidize health insurance such that
everyone prefers buying insurance.
A θ-type consumer who accepts a contract (p, γ) has utility u(p, γ, θ) with the following
standard and intuitive properties. First, if insurance is fairly priced, that is p = θ(ȳ − γ), then
consumer surplus is maximized at full insurance, γ = 0.7 At γ = 0, utility falls with a marginal
6Appendix B explicitly treats the case where insurers can invest effort e to reduce health care costs and
introduces a distribution F (y|e) of treatment costs. We abstract from this here to keep the presentation simple.
7In other words, if γ denotes a copayment, we assume that moral hazard on the part of patients plays no
role and focus on moral hazard on the part of the insurer. Allowing for patient moral hazard –either over-
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increase in γ at the rate θ with which γ is incurred by the insured. Intuitively, for copayment
γ close to 0, risk aversion is only a second-order effect. Second, for γ > 0 this effect is bigger
due to risk aversion. Third, at full insurance the types do not differ in their marginal utility
of consumption at a given price p. Finally, the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing.
Formally, these properties can be stated as
−up(p, 0, θ)θ + uγ(p, 0, θ) = 0
−up(p, γ, θ)θ + uγ(p, γ, θ) < 0 for γ > 0.
(1)
up(p, 0, θ
h) = up(p, 0, θ
l). (2)
upp(p, γ, θ) ≤ 0. (3)
When analyzing the CR case, we analyze second-degree price discrimination by the insurers.
To guarantee that the single-crossing condition is satisfied in our model, and separation of h
and l-consumers is possible, we make the following assumption on the utility function8
Assumption 1. Consider two insurance contracts (p1, γ1), (p2, γ2). Then γ1 < γ2 if and only
if
u(p1, γ1, θ
h)− u(p2, γ2, θh) > u(p1, γ1, θl)− u(p2, γ2, θl). (4)
This assumption states that the h-consumer, who has high probability of incurring γ, is always
willing to pay more than the l-consumer for a decrease in γ. In other words, lower γ is preferred
by both types, but more so by the h-consumer.
A simple example of a utility function satisfying these assumptions is mean-variance risk
aversion
u(p, q, θ) = w − p− γθ − 1
2
rθ(1− θ)γ2. (5)
with θl < θh < 1/2. Here, w is the consumer’s initial wealth, the insurance premium is p, the
expected co-payment equals γθ. The consumer is then exposed to health costs with variance
θ(1 − θ)γ2. The disutility due to risk aversion equals 1
2
rθ(1 − θ)γ2, where r > 0 is a measure
of risk aversion. At any (p, γ) the indifference curve p(γ) defined by u(p(γ), γ, θ) = C has a
more negative slope for h than for l-consumers. This implies assumption 1. A second example
of preferences satisfying these assumptions is Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u(p, γ, θ) =
consumption of health care or underinvestment in prevention– would redefine efficient insurance from γ = 0 to
some γ > 0.
8See, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 7) for a discussion of the single-crossing condition.
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(1− θ)u(w − p) + θu(w − p− γ) with u′ > 0, u′′ < 0. Note that γ > 0 can also be interpreted
as a disutility due to restricted provider choice or due to delayed treatment (waiting list).
2.2. Insurers and risk adjustment
We consider a perfectly competitive insurer market, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Insur-
ers compete in offering contracts (p, γ) to consumers. These contract offers may be restricted
to consumers of one particular type under RR, while insurers may try to screen consumers by
offering menus of contracts with distorted coverage γ under CR.
The insurers’ costs of insuring a consumer consist of the consumer’s realized expenditures
minus her copayment if she gets a health shock, y − γ, plus the contribution from the risk-
adjustment scheme implemented by the sponsor.
The sponsor offers insurers a risk-adjustment scheme (t, x) consisting of an ex ante transfer
t and ex post reimbursement indexed by x. Negative t means an ex ante payment from the
insurer to the sponsor. Within the contractible risk class, the sponsor does not observe whether
an insurer has a contract with an h or l-consumer; we denote these cases by resp. h-insurer
and l-insurer. The sponsor induces truthful revelation by offering a menu of contracts (ti, xi),
i = h, l. In other words, risk adjustment is used to separate insurer types –l or h-insurer– by
having different degrees of ex ante and ex post generosity.
We assume that an insurer’s expenditure y − γ is contractible for the sponsor, but not γ
itself. If an insured needs treatment and the insurer spends z = y−γ, then the insurer receives
ex post reimbursement r(z, x). The reimbursement function r is assumed to be smooth, satisfies
r(0, x) = 0 and rz ∈ [0, 1]: expenditure z is neither taxed nor subsidized more than one-for-
one. The index x ∈ [0, 1] parameterizing this family of reimbursement functions indicates the
generosity of the ex post scheme, rx ≥ 0. We normalize r(z, 0) = 0 and r(z, 1) = z. Thus,
x = 0 implies no ex post adjustment, while x = 1 implies full reimbursement of realized costs.
Further, rxz ≥ 0, implying that a more generous scheme raises marginal reimbursement rz.
A simple example of a reimbursement function is proportional reimbursement of costs z:
r(z, x) = xz. The analysis in the main text can be understood by keeping this proportional
reimbursement in mind. Appendix B shows that the results hold for more general ex post
schemes. For example, the sponsor could decide to reimburse only costs above a threshold z∗.
This could be optimal if high costs are less elastic with respect to insurer effort than low costs.
Define R(x, γ, θ) as the expected costs, net of ex ante payment t and premium income
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p, for an insurer of insuring a θ-consumer with a contract (p, γ), when the insurer faces ex
post reinsurance r(z, x). Expected costs equal expected net payment of treatment costs minus
expected ex post reimbursement of those costs through the risk adjustment scheme. With
proportional reimbursement we have R(x, γ, θ) = (1− x)θ(ȳ − γ).
Similarly, let C(x, γ, θ) denote the sponsor’s expected costs of financing an ex post scheme
r(.) with generosity x. By our normalization of x, we have that C(0, γ, θ) = 0. With propor-
tional ex post adjustment we have C(x, γ, θ) = xθ(ȳ − γ).
The sponsor chooses a function r(z, x) and offers a menu (tl, xl), (th, xh) to insurers, where
the insurer truthfully reveals the type (l, h) of its customer. For our analysis the function r(.)
is exogenous.9 Given this function, we derive the optimal ti, xi.
If the insurer claims to have an h-consumer, it receives th ex ante and the ex post expected
net expenditure equals R(xh, γ, θ). Truthful revelation of the insurer’s private information θ re-
quires the risk adjustment scheme to be incentive compatible, i.e., the choice of risk adjustment
contract minimizes insurer’s costs:
−tl +Rl ≤ −th + R̂h
−th +Rh ≤ −tl + R̂l
(6)
where we use short-hand notation: Rl = Rl(xl, γl) = R(xl, γl, θl), Rh = Rh(xh, γh) = R(xh, γh, θh)
and for an l-insurer who claims to be h: R̂h = R̂h(xh, γl) = R(xh, γl, θl). Similarly, an h-insurer
who claims to be l has expected costs R̂l = R̂l(xl, γh) = R(xl, γh, θh).10
As we assume perfect competition, the prices pl and ph charged by insurers to l and h-
customers reflect the sum of ex ante transfers and ex post net expected costs. If the risk
adjustment scheme is incentive compatible, prices are are given by
pl = −tl +Rl (7)
ph = −th +Rh (8)
The insurer’s incentive compatibility constraints can conveniently be written in terms of pl and
9The optimal family of reimbursement functions r will depend on the exact distribution of costs y. Kifmann
and Lorenz (2011) study the design of reimbursement functions that optimally trade off efficiency and selection
costs given a distribution of costs. Note that our analysis and results are valid for any family of functions r
that satisfies the general conditions, including the optimal family.
10Note that in these expressions the lying insurer does not adjust γ. In the proofs we check that, indeed,
when an insurer decides to lie about the type of an i-customer, there is no reason to offer such a type γ = γi.
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ph as
ph ≥ pl +Rh − R̂h (IC li)
pl ≥ ph +Rl − R̂l (IChi )
The binding insurer constraint will be (IC li): an l-insurer would like to pretend to have an
h-customer to benefit from more generous ex post adjustment xh. We work with a binding
(IC li) constraint and in the proofs we verify that (IC
h
i ) is satisfied in the equilibrium.
An l-insurer earns a positive information rent:
Rh − R̂h ≥ 0 (9)
With full reimbursement xh = 1, the rent disappears: Rh(1, γh) = R̂h(1, γl) = 0. Second, with
xh = 0 we have Rh(0, γh) = θh(ȳ − γh) and R̂h(0, γl) = θl(ȳ − γl). We assume the marginal
effect of generosity x to satisfy
Rhx(x, 0) < R̂
h
x(x, γ
l) < 0 (10)
for each γl ≥ 0. As x increases, the sponsor covers a bigger share of the realized costs. The
cost reduction is bigger for customers with higher expected costs. Increased generosity of the
ex post scheme thus reduces the information rent Rh − R̂h. With proportional reimbursement
we get d
dx
(1− x)θh(ȳ − γh) < d
dx
(1− x)θl(ȳ − γl) because θh > θl and γl ≥ γh = 0 (as we show
below). The intuition for (9) is that an l-insurer can always claim to have an h-customer: such
a mimicking insurer has lower expected costs than one with a true h-customer.
As we will see, reducing the rent Rh− R̂h reduces distortions in the health insurance market
and thereby increases total welfare. Ex post reimbursement does this, but at a cost. In
particular, ex post reimbursement leads to moral hazard on the insurers’ side. If the sponsor
covers part of the realized costs, the incentives for insurers to keep health care costs low are
reduced. Indeed, insurers face the full effort cost to keep expenditure low, but part of the
benefits flows to the sponsor. If there is no moral hazard issue on the insurer side, we have
R(x, γ, θ) + C(x, γ, θ) = θ(ȳ − γ)
Put differently, increasing x just shifts costs from the insurer to the sponsor, leaving total costs
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unaffected. In the presence of moral hazard, however, shifting part of the realized costs on to
the sponsor raises total costs as the insurer invests less effort to keep treatment costs low. In
the main text, we will include those moral hazard costs in a reduced form by assuming that
Rx(x, γ, θ) + Cx(x, γ, θ) = α(x, γ, θ) (11)
for some positive function α. This captures how more generous ex post adjustment leads to
higher overall costs. Appendix B presents a simple model where insurers invest effort to reduce
health care costs that underlies this equation and in addition derives three technical results
that we need in the proofs below.11
2.3. The sponsor’s objective
The sponsor’s problem is to design a menu of two risk adjustment schemes, (tl, xl) and (th, xh),
where insurers are required to assign each contracted consumer to one of the two schemes.12
We assume the sponsor is subject to a budget constraint with a budget normalized to 0,
φ(tl + C l) + (1− φ)(th + Ch) ≤ 0 (BC)
where C l = C(xl, γl, θl) and Ch = C(xh, γh, θh) are the costs to the scheme of paying out the
expected ex post reimbursements.
In the sections below, we analyze and compare the RR case, where insurers can explic-
itly price disciminate, with the CC case, where they can only engage in second-degree price
discrimination. The sponsor cannot directly contract on the insurer price pi and coverage γi.
These follow from the equilibrium in the insurance market, given the risk adjustment scheme
and choice of RR or CR that the sponsor imposes.
We assume that the sponsor maximizes weighted welfare and attaches weight 1 − ω to h-
consumers’ utility and ω ∈ [0, φ] to l-consumers’ utility. If ω = φ then the sponsor maximizes
total welfare. Since we assume perfect competition in the insurer market, insurer profits will
11In particular, equations (41), (42), (43).
12Alternatively, the insurer can reveal the fraction of h-customers. This leads to a similar analysis.
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be zero and the sponsor solves the following program:
max
(tl,xl),(th,xh)
W = ωu(pl, γl, θl) + (1− ω)u(ph, γh, θh)
s.t. ICh,li ,
BC and
perfectly competitive insurance market with either RR or CR
(Pω)
Solidarity is captured in two ways. First, the possibility of giving a relatively higher welfare
weight to h-consumers than their fraction in the population would justify (ω < φ), expresses a
solidarity or equity motive on the part of the sponsor.13 Second, because upp < 0 the planner
tries to keep ph and pl close together.
2.4. Timeline
Figure 1 below summarizes the timing. First, the sponsor determines the menu of risk adjust-
ment contracts (ti, xi), and either allows RR, or forces insurers to use CR. Insurers observe the
risk adjustment system and on that basis set contracts (pi, γi) that consumers choose from.
Consumers pay their chosen premiums p and insurers report their consumers’ types to the
sponsor. Insurers receive (pay) the ex ante risk adjustment transfers t. Finally, consumers


























The stage in which insurers exert effort to reduce treatment costs is treated implicitly in
the main text and modelled explicitly in appendix B.
13Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2011) give an overview of why the sponsor might have such equity considerations.
See Bijlsma, Boone and Zwart (2014) in which a similar modelling approach is used to capture solidarity.
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3. Risk rating
In this section we analyze optimal contracts in the case of RR, when insurers are allowed to
explicitly price discriminate. Section 4 analyses CR. In that case, additional consumer incentive
compatibility constraints make sure that consumers self-select into contracts designed for their
type.
In either case, our analysis proceeds as follows. We first use the binding constraints of the
sponsor’s optimization program (Pω) to express equilibrium insurance contracts (p
i, γi) in terms
of the sponsor’s contract parameters ti and xi. We show that optimal risk adjustment involves
offering ex post reinsurance only to insurers of h-consumers, xh > 0, while setting xl = 0. We
then consider the sponsor’s optimization, and in particular its dependence on the weight ω and
the moral hazard cost of reinsurance α.
In both this section and the next, the following lemma will be useful. The lemma gives the
explicit expressions for ph,l if insurer incentive compatibility (IC li) and the budget constraint
(BC) bind. It is then routine to verify that these two equations, together with expressions (7,8)
for prices under perfect competition, result in the following.
Lemma 1. If (IC li) and (BC) are binding, prices equal
pl = φ(C l +Rl) + (1− φ)(Ch +Rh)− (1− φ)(Rh − R̂h) (12)
ph = φ(C l +Rl) + (1− φ)(Ch +Rh) + φ(Rh − R̂h) (13)
We can interpret these expressions in the following way. The sum of the first two terms
in equations (12) and (13) equals the average price φpl + (1 − φ)ph, which also equals total
costs because of perfect competition. The last term in the expressions for ph and pl equals the
redistribution (Rh − R̂h ≥ 0) from the h-insurer to the l-insurer. Because an l-insurer would
like to mimic an h-insurer, the sponsor has to give the l-insurer an information rent Rh − R̂h
to induce truthful revalation of the customer’s type. Due to the budget constraint (BC), this
information rent raises ph and reduces pl.
Lemma 1 makes clear that risk adjustment helps to implement cross subsidies from l to
h-consumers. If risk adjustment is such that the information rent Rh − R̂h equals 0, prices
equal the average costs in the population. Without risk adjustment, when xh = xl = 0, there
is no cross subsidy. Indeed, in that case C l = Ch = 0 and R̂h = Rl. The lemma then shows
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that prices equal expected cost, pl = Rl(0, γl) and ph = Rh(0, γh).
A sponsor that values solidarity wants to reduce Rh − R̂h. Because getting part of their
costs reimbursed ex post is more profitable for h than for l-insurers (Rhx − R̂hx < 0), this can be
achieved by raising xh, that is, increasing ex post risk adjustment. Of course, the disadvantage
of raising xh is the inefficiency α it induces. This will increase costs, and hence average prices,
which reduces consumer utilities.
Whereas xh can reduce ph, it is clear from equations (12,13) together with (11) that xl can
only raise prices ph,l, while it has no effect on the redistribution term. Hence, it is no surprise
to find that the sponsor sets ex post risk adjustment for l-insurers to zero, xl = 0. This is the
standard “no distortion at the top” result. The following lemma characterizes the RR optimum.
Lemma 2. With RR, an insurance market equilibrium always exists and has γh = γl = 0 and
xl = 0. Further, in the sponsor’s problem, (BC) and (IC li) hold with equality.
The intuition for γh = γl = 0 is straightforward. Under RR, the insurers can separate h and
l-consumers directly and hence there is no reason to distort γ. Consumers get efficient health
insurance. Consequently, the sponsor can focus attention on a single goal: solidarity. How can
the remaining risk adjustment parameters tl, th and xh be chosen in order to lower ph ≥ pl?
We define x̄h as the level of ex post risk adjustment such that the l-insurer’s information
rent, Rh − R̂h, disappears. That is, at xh = x̄h, the costs of an h-insurer equals the costs of an
l-insurer claiming to have an h-consumer:
Rh(x̄h, 0)− R̂h(x̄h, 0) = 0 (14)
To illustrate, with proportional ex post reimbursement, we find (1− x̄h)(θh−θl)ȳ = 0 if x̄h = 1.
Consequently, at xh = x̄h, both types are charged the same price: ph = pl. We assume that
the sponsor does not want to redistribute more than ph = pl and hence chooses the optimal
xh ∈ [0, x̄h].14
It is clear that in the absence of costs to ex post risk adjustment, if α = 0 and moral hazard
is absent, the sponsor will choose to fully redistribute, xh = x̄h, so that prices for both types
are equal. Conversely, if ex post risk adjustment is very costly, the benefits of redistribution
will never outweigh the costs of doing so, and we expect that the sponsor chooses xh = 0. To
interpolate between these extremes, we parametrize the insurer moral hazard function α(x, 0, θh)
14The sponsor’s objective function in (Pω) assumes that p
h ≥ pl and hence uh ≤ ul.
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as follows, α(x, 0, θh) = εα̃(x) for some positive function α̃(.) > 0. The following proposition
summarizes how the optimal xh with RR changes as we vary ε.
Proposition 1. With risk-rating, the planner sets 0 ≥ tl ≥ th. Furthermore,
• if ε = 0 full ex post reinsurance obtains, xh = x̄h;
• if ω = φ and reinsurance is costly, ε > 0, partial reinsurance obtains, xh < x̄h;
• if ω < φ there exists an ε̄ > 0 such that xh(ε) = x̄h for all ε < ε̄.
The proposition makes two main points. First, the analysis of changes in moral hazard costs
shows when full ex post reinsurance is optimal. If the sponsor’s objective function is biased
towards the h-consumer (ω < φ), it remains optimal for the sponsor to implement ph = pl, as
long as reinsurance is not too costly (ε < ε̄). Thus, in that case the sponsor optimally sets
xh = x̄h for small moral hazard ε > 0.
Second, the proposition makes clear how the mechanism of combining ex post and ex ante
risk adjustment works. The sponsor effectively offers insurers the choice between buying rein-
surance xh > 0 at a price |th| and paying (a tax) |tl| < |th| without reinsurance (xl = 0). For
h-insurers, reinsurance is attractive. They receive ex post risk adjustment with a probability
θh > θl and their total compensation is positive. For l-insurers, however, the cost of reinsurance
exceeds the benefit. They prefer paying a tax |tl| instead. As a result, risk adjustment moves
prices closer together and redistributes towards h-consumers.
4. Community Rating
Under CR insurers cannot discriminate based on consumers’ observable characteristics. This
can arise because the sponsor does not allow insurers to use their information on relevant
characteristics when selling insurance, or because insurers do not observe such characteristics
when selling the contract. Hence, under CR the contracts (pl, γl), (ph, γh) that insurers offer
have to satisfy consumer incentive compatibility (ICh,lc ) to get truthful revelation by the insured
consumers:
u(ph, γh, θh) ≥ u(pl, γl, θh) (IChc )
u(pl, γl, θl) ≥ u(ph, γh, θl) (IC lc)
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We now have to analyze again how the equilibrium contracts that insurers offer to consumers
depend on the risk adjustment scheme offered by the sponsor to the insurers. The consumer
incentive compatibility constraints introduce additional distortions in coverage γ that we have
to take into account. For this purpose, taking the risk adjustment scheme as given, we define
the CR competitive market equilibrium as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976):
Definition 1. Vector (pl, γl, ph, γh) forms a CR equilibrium, given the risk adjustment scheme
(tl, xl, th, xh), if
• contracts (pl, γl), (ph, γh) satisfy consumer incentive compatibility conditions (IChc ) and
(IC lc),
• each contract that is offered earns a non-negative profit and
• it is not possible to introduce a (new) contract which makes strictly positive profits.
From the definition, we can make a number of observations on the equilibrium.
Lemma 3. If a CR equilibrium exists, it satisfies the following conditions
1. high types get full coverage γh = 0,
2. (IChc ) holds with equality and
3. insurers make zero profits.
These properties of the equilibrium, familiar from the Rothschild-Stiglitz context, carry
over for any risk adjustment scheme. The intuition is that, because generosity γ = 0 is optimal
–see equation (1)– the cost of a marginal reduction in γ > 0 is always less than the value the
consumer attaches to such an increase in generosity. The only reason for not reducing γ to zero
is that a constraint is hit. While the IChc constraint bars γ
l from being equal to zero, nothing
stops γh because the l-consumer does not want to mimic h: we find γh = 0.
With RR, lemma 2 guarantees existence of an equilibrium. It is well known that existence
of a separating Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is not guaranteed, as there may be a profitable
deviation to a pooling equilibrium if φ is sufficiently high. For the remainder of this analysis
we ignore this issue. We note that the sponsor can always design a risk adjustment scheme
(tl, xl), (th, xh), such that an equilibrium exists. In particular, a (pooling) equilibrium exists by
setting xh = x̄h, xl = 0. Then it is the case that ph = pl and γh = γl = 0.
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We now turn to explore the sponsor’s optimization problem, (Pω), using the constraints
that are summarized in lemma 3. The sponsor chooses a set of risk adjustment contracts,
(tl, xl), (th, xh), such that the resulting market equilibrium (pl, γl), (ph, γh) maximizes weighted
consumer surplus. With RR we have xl = 0 (see lemma 2) because xl raises prices ph,l, while
it does not affect redistribution. A similar reasoning leads to xl = 0 with CR as well. Also, as
in the RR case, the l-insurer incentive compatibility constraint and the budget constraint hold
with equality:
Lemma 4. Assume that an equilibrium exists. In the optimum, IC li and BC hold with equality,
xl = 0 and prices are given by (12,13).
We are now ready to analyze the sponsor’s optimization problem: substituting the results
in lemma’s 3 and 4 in the binding constraints, we study the optimal choice of ex post risk
adjustment xh for h-insurers. Compared to the analysis under RR, we now also have to take
into account that, in the CR market equilibrium, copayments γl may be positive. As in the
case of RR, we again characterize optimal xh as a function of the costs of reinsurance, using
α(x, 0, θh) = εα̃(x). In particular, we are interested in how optimal risk adjustment changes in
the neighborhood of the full-reinsurance point, xh = x̄h, as we allow positive reinsurance costs
ε > 0. We have the following result.
Proposition 2. With CR, the planner sets 0 ≥ tl ≥ th, γh = 0, and γl ≥ 0 such that IChc
binds. Furthermore,
• if ε = 0 full ex post reinsurance obtains, xh = x̄h and γl = 0;
• if ω = φ and reinsurance is costly, ε > 0, partial reinsurance obtains, xh < x̄h, and the
low-types’ coverage is distorted, γl > 0;
• if ω < φ, then there exists an ε̄ > 0 such xh = x̄h and γl = 0 for each ε < ε̄;
• if ε is sufficiently large, no risk adjustment obtains, th = tl = xh = xl = 0. Low type
coverage is at the Rothschild-Stiglitz level, γl = γlRS > 0.
As in the RR case, h-insurers opt for reinsurance and pay less than the actuarial cost of such
reinsurance through the ex ante payment |th|. For l-insurers, ex post insurance is less valuable,
with the consequence that they prefer paying an ex ante contribution |tl|. This again forces
prices closer together than would be the case without risk adjustment. The benefit is not only
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redistribution towards the h-consumers, but also a reduction in the distortion on l-consumer
coverage γl that goes hand in hand with a reduction in the price difference.
If ex post risk adjustment does not lead to higher costs (ε = 0), the sponsor implements the
efficient outcome with γl = 0. Equations (IChc ) and (IC
l
i) then imply that we need x
h = x̄h
to obtain this outcome. If ε > 0 and the sponsor maximizes total welfare (ω = φ), the cost
of ex post risk adjustment implies incomplete risk adjustment, and hence γl > 0 is optimal.
However, as in the RR case, if the sponsor puts more weight on the unfortunate h-consumers
(ω < φ), a range of ε > 0 exists such that the sponsor implements xh = x̄h and γl = 0. For
ε > 0 close enough to 0, increasing xh reduces ph. This reduction in ph at the expense of the
l-consumers increases welfare if ω < φ: l-consumers pay for the costs of ex post risk adjustment,
and this cost has a lower weight in the sponsor’s objective function. For high values of ε, also
ph will be increasing in xh; from that point onward, xh < x̄h and γl > 0 become optimal.
If the inefficiency of ex post reinsurance is high enough, the sponsor does not use risk
adjustment at all (xh = xl = 0 and th = tl = 0 because of (BC)). The standard Rothschild-
Stiglitz equilibrium then obtains. We know that welfare is higher with RR than it is with
CR in the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium. Indeed, without risk adjustment, the contracts for
high types are the same under RR and CR while there is inefficient coverage for the low types
(γl > 0) under CR. In contrast, for low costs of ex post reinsurance, the following section shows
that CR can lead to higher welfare than RR.
5. When is CR optimal?
This section compares total welfare under RR and CR. As explained in the introduction, health
economists tend to view CR as Pareto inferior to RR. This is true in a setting where the
information asymmetry between sponsor and insurers is not explicitly addressed. In our set
up, the sponsor combines ex ante and ex post risk adjustment to induce insurers to truthfully
reveal their private information. In this second-best case, CR can lead to higher welfare than
RR. In particular, if the sponsor’s objective is biased towards high types and the moral hazard
inefficiency is positive but not too high, we find that CR dominates RR.
Let WRR(ε) denote the optimal value of (Pω) in the RR case and WCR(ε) in the CR case as
a function of ε with α(x, 0, θh) = εα̃(x) as before. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If ω < φ and assuming that xhRR(ε) = x̄
h is globally optimal whenever it is
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locally optimal. Then:
1. WCR(ε) = WRR(ε) for ε ≥ 0 small enough;
2. WCR(ε) > WRR(ε) for ε > 0 in a middle range;
3. WRR(ε) > WCR(ε) for ω > 0 and ε big enough.
As we make few assumptions on second derivatives, we cannot be sure that the optimal xh
is well behaved as a function of ε. For our result that CR can dominate RR, we only need that
xh under RR remains at its maximum level until that ceases to be locally optimal. A simple
set up with (i) r(x, z) = xz, (ii) mean variance utility and (iii) α̃′(x) ≥ 0 is enough to get this
behavior (see footnote 16 in the appendix).
It follows from propositions 1 and 2 above that for ε ≥ 0 small enough and ω < φ, the
solutions under RR and CR are the same: xh = x̄h, γl = 0 and prices are the same as well.
Hence, WCR = WRR for these values of ε. Further, if ε is big enough that no risk adjustment
is used (xh = th = tl = 0) we know that RR strictly dominates CR (if ω > 0) in the Rothschild
and Stiglitz outcome.
The interesting case is in between these two extremes. The proposition shows that a range
of ε exists such that CR dominates RR in terms of weighted welfare W . CR, with its distortive
coverage γl > 0, can outperform RR which has efficient coverage for both types. To understand
this result, first note that, as the moral hazard parameter ε increases, xhCR falls below x̄
h before
xhRR does. The sponsor screens insurer types with ex post reinsurance x
h and extracts rents from
l-consumers to redistribute to the h-consumers. Having γl > 0, which relaxes insurer incentive
compatibility, IC li , increases the potential for rent extraction. Indeed, the difference in benefits
of reinsurance between both insurer types is larger because expected expenses for l-insurers are
even lower if γl > 0. As consumers pay part of the cost if γ denotes a copayment,15 the benefit
of reinsurance for mimicking l-insurers is reduced. Consequently, the sponsor can extract larger
ex ante payments from l-insurers without violating their incentive compatibility constraint.
These payments are passed on to consumers, bringing prices for both consumer types closer
together. The reduction in xh –by increasing γl– is therefore initially more attractive under CR






h) = WRR(ε) (15)
15Or accept reduced provider choice at a lower premium with lower expected costs.
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for values of ε where xhCR(ε) < x̄
h = xhRR(ε). For these values of ε, x̄
h could be implemented
under CR in which case welfare would be the same as under RR. But xhCR < x̄
h, hence WCR is
higher than under x̄h and consequently it is higher than WRR.
CR thus outperforms RR if the cost of reinsurance is small but not too small. Inefficiency
γl > 0 has the benefit of reducing ph which is beneficial for h-consumers which get higher weight
(1−ω > 1−φ) in the sponsor’s objective. In fact, with ω = 0 CR always (weakly) outperforms
RR (as there is no welfare cost of γl > 0). In this sense, policy makers’ preference for CR can be
better founded than health economists tend to acknowledge. A bias in favour of h-consumers
because the sponsor values solidarity together with risk adjustment as an instrument to screen
insurers can motivate a choice for CR.
6. Conclusion
We studied optimal risk adjustment in competitive health insurance markets when insurers have
better information on their customers’ risk profiles than the sponsor of the health insurance
scheme. This occurs if the insurer observes more consumer characteristics than the ex ante
system corrects for. Such information advantage allows insurers to game the system by cherry
picking insured whose expected costs are low within their (ex ante) risk adjustment class.
A risk adjustment system with both ex ante and ex post components can avoid this cost
by inducing insurers to truthfully reveal their private information. By offering some ex post
reinsurance to separate insurer types, the sponsor can redistribute from low to high risk con-
sumers. If reinsurance does not induce costs due to moral hazard, the sponsor can achieve both
optimal efficiency as well as solidarity by completely reinsuring insurers. In practice, however,
such ex post risk adjustment is likely to be costly due to moral hazard and the sponsor only
offers partial reinsurance.
The sponsor can improve on this equilibrium by adding one more distortion. A distortion
on the low-risks’ contracts’ generosity reduces not only their welfare, but also their information
rent. The lower information rent here appears as redistribution to the high types. In health
insurance, contract generosity is typically hard to contract on for the sponsor. We show that
in the presence of such incontractibility, the sponsor can gain by enforcing an equilibrium in
which this distortion emerges endogenously by imposing CR.
Although CR is never optimal in the absence of a motivation to screen insurers, when risk
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adjustment tries to elicit the insurers’ private information, CR can raise total weighted surplus
if the preference for redistribution is sufficiently high. The resulting distortions in consumer
contracts, which in themselves are socially costly, relax the incentive compatibility constraint
of the insurers: by reducing the insurers’ expected costs for low risk consumers, CR makes
reinsurance a less attractive option for these insurers. This makes it easier for the sponsor to
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A. Proofs of results
Proof of lemma 2 The proof has the following steps. First, we argue that γl = γh = 0. Then,
we show that xl = 0 assuming that (IC li) and (BC) are binding. Finally, we check that (IC
h
i )
is satisfied as well.
Because insurers can risk-rate, insurance contracts do not have to satisfy consumer incentive
compatibility constraints (as with CR in section 4). Suppose in equilibrium one of the insurers
offers a contract with γ > 0. Because consumers are risk-averse and the insurer is risk-neutral,
consumers value increased insurance (lower γ) more than it costs the insurer to provide that
insurance (where we use that rz ∈ [0, 1]). Thus the insurer can raise profits by reducing γ.
Hence both h and l-consumers get offered efficient insurance contracts (γ = 0). Note that
γh = γl = 0 holds irrespective of whether the insurer reports the customer’s type truthfully to
the sponsor.
Equation (BC) holds with equality. If it would be slack, it is possible to raise th, tl keeping
IC li and IC
h
i binding. This unambiguously increases the sponsor’s objective function. Next
consider the insurer IC constraints. At least one of these is binding. Suppose not, i.e. both
(IC li) and (IC
h
i ) are slack. Then we can reduce p
h and increase pl (by adjusting th,l) in a way
that satisfies (BC). This increases W because ω ≤ φ, upp ≤ 0 and (IC li) together with (9) imply
ph > pl. We assume here that (IC li) is binding and check afterwards that (IC
h
i ) is satisfied as
well.
Because both (IC li) and (BC) hold with equality, we use lemma 1 for the prices p
h,l. Then

































< 0 and ∂(C
l+Rl)
∂xl
= α(xl, γ, θl) ≥ 0. It follows that xl = 0.
We finish this proof by checking that (IChi ) is satisfied. By adding the insurer’s incentive
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constraints, it follows that
Rl − R̂h ≤ R̂l −Rh (16)
As (IC li) holds with equality, (16) implies that (IC
h
i ) holds as well. With x
l = 0, (16) can be
written as
Rl(0, 0)− R̂h(xh, 0) ≤ R̂l(0, 0)−Rh(xh, 0) (17)







which holds because of equation (10). Q.E.D.















= (1− φ)α(xh, 0, θh)(ωulp + (1− ω)uhp) + |Rhx − R̂hx|(|uhp |φ(1− ω)− |ulp|ω(1− φ))
where we used (10). The first term is negative as up < 0 and α(x
h, 0, θh) = εα̃(xh) ≥ 0: this
is the inefficiency due to ex post reimbursement. The second term captures the positive effect
of ex post reimbursement on solidarity: reducing the redistribution from h to l by raising xh.
This term is indeed positive for xh ∈ [0, x̄h] because ph ≥ pl together with equations (2,3) and
ω ≤ φ.
If ε = 0 then ∂W/∂xh ≥ 0 and the sponsor equalizes prices by setting xh = x̄h.
If ε > 0 and ω = φ, then ∂W/∂xh|xh=x̄h < 0 and hence xh < x̄h.
If ω < φ, there exists ε̄ > 0 as defined in the proposition.16
16If we assume r = xz and mean variance utility as in (5), we have |Rhx − R̂hx| = (θh − θl)ȳ and up = −1.
Then we can write
∂W
∂xh
= −(1− φ)εα̃(x) + (θh − θl)ȳ(φ− ω) (19)
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Finally, equation (6) implies
tl − th ≥ Rl(0, 0)− R̂h(xh, 0) ≥ 0 (21)
where the last inequality follows from (41). Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 3
• Suppose to the contrary that high types are not fully covered, γh > 0. Then an insurer
could offer a new, more profitable contract with slightly higher coverage, as, by inequality
(1), the high type consumer’s value of such lower γh grows more strongly than the costs
to the insurer, since rγ(y− γ, x) ∈ [−1, 0]. Such a new contract will certainly continue to
satisfy IChc . If l-consumers decide to buy this contract as well, it becomes more profitable
as their expected costs are lower. This profitable deviation contradicts definition 1. Hence
γh = 0.
• Suppose –by contradiction– that IChc is slack. We consider two cases:
– γl > 0: because of equation (1), a new contract with γ̃l < γl and p̃l > pl+(γl− γ̃l)θl
can be introduced which l-consumers prefer (but h-consumers do not; as IChc is
slack by assumption) and which leads to strictly positive profits. This contradicts
definition 1.
– γl = 0: then we have
u(ph, 0, θh) > u(pl, 0, θh)(slackness of IChc )
u(pl, 0, θl) ≥ u(ph, 0, θl)(by IC lc).
But this is impossible because up < 0.
Hence, in each case there is a violation and thus IChc cannot be slack. With (IC
h
c ) holding
with equality, assumption 1 implies that (IC lc) is satisfied as well.
Then, if moreover α̃′(x) ≥ 0, W is concave in xh, and we find
ε̄ =
(θh − θl)ȳ(φ− ω)
(1− φ)α̃(x̄h) > 0. (20)
.
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• Suppose an insurer makes positive profits in equilibrium. If positive profits are from h-
consumers, an insurer can offer a new contract with slightly lower ph and make a strictly
positive profit. Even if l-consumers choose this contract as well, it is profitable (as l-
consumers have lower expected costs than h-consumers). This contradicts definition 1.
Next, consider the case where the insurers make a profit on the l-consumers. Then one
can construct a new profitable contract γ̃l > γl, p̃l < pl such that IChc remains satisfied
and the new contract is more attractive to l-consumers. Again this contradicts definition
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 4
• We first show that IC li binds. Assume to the contrary that IC li is slack. First, suppose
that γl > 0. Then the sponsor can slightly increase th and decrease tl without violating
IC li (such a change cannot violate IC
h
i ). Such a transfer from l to h-consumers is in itself
beneficial for welfare, as welfare is biased towards h-consumers. The transfer increases
pl and decrease ph, which relaxes IChc . This, in turn, allows γ
l to fall in the resulting
equilibrium, and hence W is increased; a contradiction.
If, instead, γl = 0, we are in a pooling equilibrium, with necessarily pl = ph, or
−th +Rh = ph = pl = −tl +Rl < −th + R̂h
where the inequality represents slack IC li . But this cannot hold since R
h ≥ R̂h by (9).
• Next, we verify that (IC li) also holds for γ = γl, i.e.
−tl +Rl(xl, γl) ≤ −th + R̂h(xh, γl) (22)
also when γl in R̂h(xh, γl) is replaced by another γ ≥ 0. First, consider γ > γl. As the
l-consumer is risk averse, utility falls faster with γ than the insurer’s costs because of
equation (43) in appendix B. Hence, it is not a profitable deviation for the insurer to
offer the l-consumer γ > γl and then claim it is an h-consumer. Second, consider γ < γl
(in case γl > 0). To make this deviation contract (p, γ) attractive for the l-consumer, it
needs to be the case that u(p, γ, θl) ≥ u(pl, γl, θl). Then a binding (IChc ) together with
assumption 1 implies that u(p, γ, θh) > u(ph, 0, θh): h-consumers buy this contract as
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well. We find
φR̂h(xh, γ) + (1− φ)Rh(xh, γ) ≥ R̂h(xh, γl) (23)
because R̂hγ ≤ 0 (equation (60)) and Rh ≥ R̂h (equation (9)). Hence,
−tl +Rl(xl, γl) ≤ −th + R̂h(xh, γl) ≤ −th + φR̂h(xh, γ) + (1− φ)Rh(xh, γ)
and this deviation is not profitable.
• Next, if (BC) is slack, it would be possible to raise th, tl and ql, keeping IC li and IChc
binding. This unambiguously increases welfare.
• With (IC li) and (BC) binding, lemma 1 implies that ph,l are given by (12,13).







• Finally, we use figure 2 to show that xl = 0. The curve shows an indifference curve for
the l and h-consumer. The intersection of these two curves determines the contract γl, pl.
Denote by γl(xl) the solution for γl as a function of the choice of xl. We have that
(ph, γh = 0) and (pl, γl) should always be on the same h-consumer’s indifference curve, by
binding IChc . Furthermore, prices are determined by γ




= φα > 0 (24)
∂ph
∂γl
= −φθl − φR̂hγ < 0 (25)
∂pl
∂xl
= φα > 0 (26)
∂pl
∂γl
= −φθl + (1− φ)R̂hγ
⎧⎨
⎩ < 0≥ −θl (27)
where −θl ≤ R̂hγ ≤ 0 from (60).









Figure 2: The indifference curves for h and l-consumers. Regions A and B are bordered by the
(nearest) lines.
and one in which γl increases with xl. We show that in both cases, W is decreasing in xl.
Hence, xl = 0 is optimal.















so ph increases with rising xl, and hence high types are worse off (uh decreases: indifference
curve shifts upward in figure 2). Since γl decreases by assumption, the new intersection
(pl, γl) in the figure will be in region A in the figure, and clearly ul also decreases. Hence,
in this case, the increase in xl reduces both uh and ul and thus W .


















Since the l-consumer is risk averse, the indifference curve ul has slope less than −θl: an
increase in γl should be compensated by a fall in pl that is bigger than θl (equation (1)).
However, |∂pl/∂γl| ≤ θl by equation (27) and ul falls (indifference curve shifts upward).
As γl increases in this case, (pl, γl) is in region B and again, both uh and ul decrease.
Therefore, also in this case, W falls with xl. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2 To find the welfare effects of γl and xh, we first derive how γl and
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where we used shorthand
ûh = u(pl, γl, θh), uh = u(ph, 0, θh).
From equations (12,13) we find
∂ph
∂xh
= (1− φ)α + φ(Rhx − R̂hx) (30)
∂ph
∂γl





= (1− φ)α− (1− φ)(Rhx − R̂hx) (32)
∂pl
∂γl
= φ(C lγ +R
l
γ) + (1− φ)R̂hγ (33)
Using this and evaluating at xh = x̄h, γl = 0, we find
∂W
∂xh
= (−up)[−(1− φ)α(x̄h, 0, θh) + (φ− ω)|Rhx − R̂hx|] (34)
∂W
∂γl
























From this the claims about ε̄ in the proposition follow.
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with α = εα̃(0) for ε high enough. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 3 First note that ε = 0 implies WRR(0) = WCR(0) because in this
case xh = x̄h, pl = ph and γl = γh = 0 under both RR and CR. Further, propositions 1 and 2
imply that for ω < φ there exists ε̄ such that WRR(ε) = WCR(ε) for each ε ∈ [0, ε̄].
By equation (43): 0 < R̂hγ + θ



























Thus, there exist values of ε such that ∂WRR/∂x
h|xh=x̄h ≥ 0 > ∂WCR/∂xh|xh=x̄h . For these
values of ε we have xhRR(ε) = x̄
h > xhCR(ε). With a slight abuse of notation, we write welfare
as W (ε, xh(ε)). Then we have for these values of ε that17
WCR(ε, x
h
CR(ε)) > WCR(ε, x̄
h) = WRR(ε, x̄
h) = WRR(ε, x
h
RR(ε)) (40)




RS. Then we know






RR. Hence, ω > 0 implies that WCR(ε) < WRR(ε) for such high
values of ε. Q.E.D.
17Note that we do not exclude the possibility where xhCR drops discontinuously from x̄
h to some xhCR < x̄
h.
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B. General ex post schemes
This appendix introduces a simple model where insurers invest effort to keep health expendi-
tures low. We derive equations (9) and (11) from the main text:
Rh − R̂h ≥ 0
Rx(x, γ, θ) + Cx(x, γ, θ) = α(x, γ, θ) ≥ 0
and the following three results:
Rl(0, γl)− R̂h ≥ 0 (41)
Rlγ(0, γ
l) = −θl (42)
|R̂hγ | ≤ θl (43)
The intuition for these three results is as follows. First, suppose that there is no ex post transfer
for l-consumers: xl = 0. If an l-insurer claims to be h, part of her costs are reimbursed ex post
which lowers ex post costs compared to the case where it truthfully reveals the customer’s type.
With proportional reimbursement this clearly holds: θl(ȳ − γl) ≥ (1 − xh)θl(ȳ − γl). Second,
assuming xl = 0, a small increase in γl reduces the costs of an l-insurer by the probability θl
that γl is paid to the insurer: d(θ
l(ȳ−γ))
dγ
= −θl. Third, when an l-insurer claims to be h, part
of the expenditure is reimbursed ex post, hence the effect of an increase in γ is smaller. With
proportional reimbursement | d
dγ
(1− xh)θl(y − γ)| ≤ | d
dγ
θl(y − γ)| = θl.
Our claim is that a broad range of ex post risk adjustment systems satisfies these conditions.
For the analysis here, these are the aspects of ex post risk adjustment that are important. The
following model yields the required results.
Let Y = [y, ȳ] denote the range of expenditures y, once an agent falls ill. When interpreting
γ as copayment, we assume y > γ over the relevant range of γ.18 Insurers can invest effort
e to reduce expenditure. Let F (y|e) denote the distribution function of y, which is the same
for both types l, h. Then comparing two effort levels e1 > e2, we assume that F (y|e2) first
order stochastically dominates F (y|e1). That is, F (y|e2) ≤ F (y|e1). Expected expenditure
18In fact, the highest γ that is relevant for our analysis is γl in the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome. Hence, we
assume γlRS < y.
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First order stochastic dominance implies that ȳe(e) ≤ 0. The expected ex post reimbursement
can be written as
r̄(x, γ, e) =
∫
Y
r(y − γ, x)dF (y|e) (45)
where the exogenously given function r(z, x) is defined in the main text. As rz ≥ 0, first order
stochastic dominance implies that r̄e ≤ 0. Further, rz(z, x) ∈ [0, 1] implies that r̄γ(x, γ, e) ∈
[−1, 0].
We assume that insurers’ effort cost ψ(e) is incurred once an insured needs treatment.
What we have in mind is the following: once a patient falls ill, the insurer can check whether
treatments are necessary, try to guide the patient to a cheaper provider etc. The insurer chooses
effort e that minimizes total costs:
R(x, γ, θ) = min
e
θ[ȳ(e)− γ − r̄(x, γ, e) + ψ(e)] (46)
Let e(x, γ) denote the effort level that solves this minimization problem. In case of an interior
solution, we have
ȳe(e(x, γ))− r̄e(x, γ, e(x, γ)) + ψe(e(x, γ)) = 0 (47)
It follows that de/dx ≤ 0. This can be seen as follows:
[ȳee(e(x, γ))− r̄ee(x, γ, e(x, γ)) + ψee(e(x, γ))]de
dx
= r̄ex(x, γ, e(x, γ)) (48)
The expression in square brackets is positive (second order condition) and the right hand side
is non-positive (first order stochastic dominance with rxz(z, x) ≥ 0). Hence, we find de/dx ≤ 0:
as the ex post reimbursement becomes more generous, insurers invest less effort.
The cost for the sponsor of implementing ex post insurance with generosity x is given by
C(x, γ, θ) = θr̄(x, γ, e(x, γ)) (49)
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Total cost can then be written as
R(x, γ, θ) + C(x, γ, θ) = θ(ȳ(e(x, γ))− γ + ψ(e(x, γ))) (50)
Hence we find that








where the second equality follows from (47); the inequality follows from r̄e ≤ 0 and de/dx ≤ 0
derived above. Writing α(x, γ, θ) = θr̄ede/dx ≥ 0, we find equation (11).
The following inequalities derive equation (9):
Rh(x, 0) = R(x, 0, θh) = θh[ȳ(e(x, 0))− r̄(x, 0, e(x, 0)) + ψ(e(x, 0))] ≥ (53)
θl[ȳ(e(x, 0))− r̄(x, 0, e(x, 0)) + ψ(e(x, 0))] ≥ (54)
θl[ȳ(e(x, 0))− γl − r̄(x, γl, e(x, 0)) + ψ(e(x, 0))] ≥ (55)
θl[ȳ(e(x, γl))− γl − r̄(x, γl, e(x, γl)) + ψ(e(x, γl))] = R(x, γl, θl) = R̂h(x, γl) (56)
where the first inequality follows from θh > θl, the second from γl ≥ 0 and r̄γ ∈ [−1, 0], the
third inequality from the fact that e(x, γl) minimizes the insurer’s cost with an l-insured.
With a similar reasoning we can prove (41):
Rl(0, γl) = θl[ȳ(e(0, γl))− γl + ψ(e(0, γl))] ≥ (57)
θl[ȳ(e(0, γl))− γl − r̄(x, γl, e(0, γl)) + ψ(e(0, γl))] ≥ (58)
θl[ȳ(e(x, γl))− γl − r̄(x, γl, e(x, γl)) + ψ(e(x, γl))] = R̂h(x, γl) (59)
Finally,
Rγ(x, γ, θ
l) = R̂hγ(x, γ) = −θl(1 + r̄γ(x, γ, e)) ≥ −θl (60)
because r̄γ ∈ [−1, 0]; which proves (43). Further, r̄(0, γ, e) = 0 for all γ ≥ 0; hence Rγ(0, γ, θl) =
−θl: equation (42).
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